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Forgetting the South and the
Southern Strategy
Michelle Brattain
1 Let's begin with a true story about the modern South.
2 In 2002 the Dodge County (GA) commission voted to fly the Confederate Battle flag
outside  their  courthouse  one  day  a  year  in  honor  of  Confederate  Memorial  Day
(Bennet). Given the simultaneous uproar over the placement of the stars and bars on
Georgia's state flag—the official state banner changed three times in the space of just
twenty-seven months prior to May 2003—Dodge County's policy seemed a moderate,
even temperate, compromise between those who wished to honor “Southern” history
and those who argued that the stars and bars should not have any official sanction by
the state. Until 2001, Georgia had flown the 1956 state flag, adopted by segregationist
legislators in the heat of massive resistance, which defiantly devoted two-thirds of the
flag's  real  estate  to  the  Confederate  stars  and  bars.  At  the  time,  the  Democratic
Governor's  floor leader had declared that  the flag would “show that we in Georgia
intend to uphold what we stood for, will stand for and will fight for”—in other words,
segregation (Martinez 224). But times had changed in the twenty-first century, and led
by  Democratic  Governor  Roy  Barnes,  the  legislature  adopted  a  new,  somewhat
awkward, compromise design giving equal space to all five flags that had historically
flown over the state, including the Confederate battle flag but also two American flags.
However, this aesthetically-challenged flag, like Barnes, would not be long for Georgia.1
3 As  Sons  of  Confederate  Veterans  (SCV)  and  the  Heritage  Preservation  Association
demanded a return of the Stars and Bars, Republican gubernatorial candidate Sonny
Perdue announced his support for a referendum on the flag. In 2002, this position won
Perdue, formerly a state senator and a Democrat, enough white rural votes to defeat
Barnes and make him the first Republican Governor of Georgia since Reconstruction.
Two-thirds of Georgians, according to an Atlanta Journal-Constitution poll, wanted a flag
referendum, and more than half considered the stars and bars a symbol of Southern
heritage (Wilson and Silk 183). But the referendum on the 1956 flag never came to pass.
After the election Perdue began distancing himself  from Confederate symbols,  even
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banning the flag's display at his inauguration. Angry “flaggers” protested with three
small planes flying over the inauguration with thirty-three-foot banners displaying the
1956 flag and demanding: “Let us vote. You Promised” (Galloway, 2003, 1A). In 2004 the
referendum took place, but the choices were limited to the Barnes flag and yet another
new stars-and-bars-free design, outraging the “flaggers” and eliciting a sigh of relief
from Republicans worried about tainting the party's image in an election year and pro-
business Georgians worried about what kind of message that might send about the state
(“Phew” Economist). Flaggers now threatened to throw their support to a Democrat in
the next gubernatorial election, “just to send a message”, according to a member of the
Heritage Preservation Association (Galloway 2004,  1D).  As “Sonny Lied” signs began
popping up on highways throughout rural Georgia and flaggers vowed to seek revenge
at  the  ballot  box,  Dodge  County's  2002  decision  must  have  appeared  quite
extraordinary—a model of a New South committed to remembering history, not reliving
it.
4 The only thing was that Dodge County's Commissioners didn't remove the flag after
Confederate Memorial Day. They never took it down. It has been flying continuously
outside the courthouse in Eastman, Georgia for nearly a decade (Bennet). In 2011 when
the President of the Dodge County NAACP asked the county to comply with the original
law,  the majority-white county commission,  anticipating a  law suit  from either the
NAACP or the SCV no matter what they did, passed a new law permitting year-round
display of the battle flag—which is now padlocked to the pole (Bennet, Richards).
5 Perhaps the never-ending saga over the Confederate flag is low-hanging fruit in the
quest  to  make  a  point  about  Southern  exceptionalism.  White  racial  insensitivity  is
undoubtedly not unique to the South (Sugrue 209-258, McGirr 185, 305). As a Southern
transplant  attending  graduate  school  in  New Jersey,  I  still  remember  the  shock  of
discovering that 1. Whites outside the South were not universally racial liberals and 2.
“Northerners”  nevertheless  made  many  assumptions  about  all  white  Southerners,
including me. Seven years at Rutgers University cured me of a telltale Charlotte, NC
accent but it  also motivated me to do Southern history,  because I  was certain that
“myth” and the desire to exoticize the South had prevented historians from seeing its
complexity. I remember feeling compelled to challenge scholarly assumptions about a
universal  white  Southern  identification  with  the  Confederacy  and to  inform fellow
students in a Southern history seminar that in fact my family never sat around the
supper table romanticizing the Lost Cause or rehashing Civil War battles. It was wrong,
and perversely ahistorical, to assume a direct line of continuity between the 19th and
the  20th century  South.  Other  aspects  of  “Southern”  distinctiveness, however,  rang
uncomfortably true for me, especially in recent history. There were no Klan members
hidden in my family closets, but it was true that my parents were Nixon-era converts to
the Republican Party, motivated in no small part by school busing and their sense that
Nixon represented the “high-class” alternative to men like George Wallace and (then-
Democrat) Jesse Helms. My folks never advocated integration and they hated busing,
but they were good Southern folk with the “right” raising, who had enough sense to be
moderate and polite about their demands.
6 So my own response to the recent scholarly trend of declaring the “end of Southern
history” and the “myth” of Southern exceptionalism has been ambivalence. On the one
hand,  I  understand  the  impulse  to  expose  the  myth  of  American  racism  as  an
exclusively  Southern  phenomenon  and  to  do  justice  to  the  genuine  complexity  of
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Southern history. My own dissertation research was motivated by my desire to show
that white Southern workers were more than the hapless counterparts of the other
“American” workers or victims of false consciousness disciplined by the threat of a
phantom  black  industrial  army  waiting  to  steal  their  jobs.  There  was  then,  and
probably still is, a hardy tradition of thinking of the South as the anomaly in a norm of
“American” history (Lassiter and Crespino 7-11). That faith has long justified Southern
history's existence as a traditional subfield that, in spite of many scholarly challenges,
predictably rises from the ashes like a phoenix every time a new cohort of historians
offers a dedicated graduate seminar, presents their work at regional conferences, or
publishes in specialized journals. The indisputable truth that all Southern historians
have to face is that the South has at times been quite different—obviously because of
the extent and duration of slavery, secession and the Civil War, Reconstruction, the
segregation and disfranchisement of black voters, and more recently the very visible,
public  civil  rights  movement  and  an  equally  visible  opposition.  The  South  has
historically  been  more  rural,  agrarian,  and  poor,  with  distinctively  low  rates  of
unionization and an economy dominated in the first half of the twentieth century by
low-wage industries. Its politics have also been historically peculiar, functioning as a de
facto  one-party  state  dominated for  nearly  a  century  by  the  Democratic  Party  and
profoundly  shaped  by  near  universal  black  disfranchisement.  And  even  within  the
Democratic  Party,  Southerners  were  frequently  distinctive:  consistently  anti-union,
anti-civil rights, pro-military, anti-communist to the extreme, and more conservative
generally,  voting more frequently with conservative Republicans than Democrats in
Congress.
7 Even  as  the  South  was  transformed  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth century,
presumably  becoming  more  urban,  suburban,  industrial,  and  diverse—e.g.
“American”—it still seemed to change and act as a region, especially in politics. First in
1964, the once reliably Democratic South began to withdraw its loyalty to the national
party that had begun to champion black civil rights. In the 1964 Presidential election,
five  deep-South  states  threw  their  support  to  the  Republican  candidate,  Barry
Goldwater, one of a handful of Senators that had voted against the Civil Rights Act. In
1968, Southern states divided between Republican Richard Nixon and former Alabama
Governor  and  Independent  George  Wallace,  but  roundly  rejected  the  Democrats,
seemingly forever. Almost overnight, the single-party, solid South was no more. White
Southern voters, and white Southern politicians, shifted in droves to the Republican
Party  in  national  elections,  making  the  South  a  new  Republican  and  conservative
stronghold. (Lesher, 311-313, 436; Rieder 243-69; Black and Black 1-39).
8 Wrapped up in this narrative of party realignment is the most “modern” article of faith
behind Southern exceptionalism: the Republican “Southern strategy.” Richard Nixon
and his advisors, the story goes, stole a page from the Goldwater and Wallace playbooks
and wooed white Southern voters into the Republican party with appeals to festering
racial  resentments.  But  they  didn't  act  like  Southern  segregationists  or  openly
champion white supremacy.  Rather,  the Republicans employed a coded language of
“state's  rights,”  “law  and  order,”  and  “forced  busing.”  (Carter  1996  xi-xiv,  Rieder
243-69) As Nixon aide John Erlichman later described it in Witness to Power, Nixon took
strong positions on busing, quotas, and crime, but “always couched his views in such a
way that a citizen could avoid admitting to himself that he was attracted by a racist
appeal.” There were, for example, “plausible reasons to be against open housing that
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  fact  that  most  public-housing-project  dwellers”  were
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minorities,  so  that's  what  they  offered.  (Erlichman  223,  Carter  1996,  30).  Such
disingenuous campaigning, invented by Wallace and perfected by Nixon, some scholars
have  argued,  has  kept  the  white  South  unapologetically  coming  back  for  more
“colorblind” Republicanism every four years.
9 It's this last chapter in Southern exceptionalism that has recently come under fire. As
one  historian  put  it  bluntly:  “The  'Southern  strategy'  explanation  of  the  political
transformation of  the  modern South is  wrong” (Lassiter  2006,  5).  Moreover,  as  co-
editors  and  contributing  authors  to  the  2009  anthology  The  Myth  of  Southern
Exceptionalism,  Matthew Lassiter  and Joseph Crespino argue that  the “notion of  the
exceptional  South  has  served  as  a  myth,  one  that  has  persistently  distorted  our
understanding of American history.” Their goal is  not to “absolve the South but to
implicate the nation” (Lassiter and Crespino 7). Neither denies the history of racism in
the South or its role in Southern-style massive resistance. Rather both argue that the
tendency to associate white racism exclusively with the South—a practice perpetuated
by South-centered accounts of the Civil Rights movement and the “Southern strategy”
account of partisan political realignment—has obscured the presence of white racism
and racially inflected politics elsewhere in the United States. As they point out, two
weeks before President Eisenhower sent the National Guard to protect black students
from segregationist mobs in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Governor of Pennsylvania was
forced to  dispatch state  troopers to  the Philadelphia suburb of  Levittown.  There,  a
white mob of 400 people turned out to protest a black family that had just moved in,
tormenting  them  with  loud  music  and  car  horns,  vandalizing  their  home,  and
displaying a Confederate battle flag. Clashes between the Pennsylvania troopers and
residents lasted for a week. Americans remember Little Rock, but not Levittown. The
reason, Lassiter and Crespino suggest,  is  because history and popular memory have
“reinforce[d] a selective historical consciousness about the civil  rights era, which is
typically  portrayed  as  an  epic  showdown  between  the  retrograde  South  and  a
progressive nation.” (4-7). In reality, they argue, “most regional characteristics cited as
evidence of difference of kind are really differences of degree.” (12). Thus contributors
to The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism frequently turn their gaze elsewhere—reminding
us not only that whites rioted against housing integration in Pennsylvania, but that
segregation (of the Chinese) existed out west, and that NY prisons could be as brutal as
Mississippi's notorious Parchman Farm.
10 But the most vociferous challenges to Southern exceptionalism have come primarily
through  scholarship  of  the  South  itself.  Unlike  the  old  “top-down”  arguments
suggesting that Nixon orchestrated the late 1960s “backlash” against Civil Rights, these
authors all describe a quiet revolution from below. Republicans did not “Southernize”
the nation; rather the dramatic economic and social changes that swept through the
South after the 1950s dramatically transformed the region, making it more like the rest
of the nation (even if contemporaries tended not to notice). In the process, political
power shifted from the rural Black Belt to the metropolitan frontiers of the sunbelt.
Although the emphasis varies across this new scholarship, two factors are thought key:
the urbanization and more importantly suburbanization of the South, and as a result, the
mobilization of Southern whites around new “colorblind” conservative political issues
such as private schools, busing, or social values (Lassiter 2006, 225-250, Kruse 259-266,
Crespino  205-206,  271).  In  a  move  that  has  been  long  overdue,  these  new  works
simultaneously reveal the existence of a wide variety of opinion and conviction about
race from the 1950s through the 1980s. The white South had its William Simmonses and
Forgetting the South and the Southern Strategy
Miranda, 5 | 2011
4
Bull Connors and its Anne Bradens and Connie Currys, but there were a lot, a majority
in fact, of people in between who varied in their commitment to segregation, who were
willing  to  follow  the  law—even  if  they  did  not  like  it,  and  who  actually  adjusted
themselves and their politics to the new racial order (Lassiter 251-275, Kruse 138-139).
Judge Tom P. Brady, Mississippi author of the notorious Black Monday is a case in point.
Though as a leader of the Citizens' Council he authored some of the most vicious racial
propaganda produced during the massive resistance era, on the bench he did his duty
to uphold the law, “irrespective of how erroneous it may appear, or how odious it is,”
because “a decision of the United States Supreme Court is still the ultimate in judicial
determination and is binding on the tribunals and citizens of the respective states.”
(Crespino 175).
11 All the new Southern revisionists emphasize how demographic changes transformed
the politics of both the South and the nation. Lassiter, for example, suggests that the
key to understanding partisan political realignment after 1964 is not the exploitation of
Southern  politics,  but  suburban politics,  which  were  a  national  phenomenon  with
profoundly  racial  implications  (Lassiter  2006,  3-5,  Lassiter  2004).  In  the  South,  as
elsewhere, the suburbs were produced by entrenched racial structures, from restrictive
covenants to the FHA's racially skewed method of awarding mortgage subsidies, which,
by the 1960s, had helped generations of whites accumulate substantial economic and
cultural  capital.  The  suburbs  also  provided  a  haven  for  whites  fleeing  municipal
integration.  In  Atlanta,  when segregationist  efforts  were  foiled  by  white  city  elites
content to desegregate public facilities that elites didn't use anyway, blue-collar and
middle-class whites fled to the suburbs, where, in Kevin Kruse's words, they “made
their dreams manifest in the spatially and socially removed lands of suburbia” far from
the “pollution, bad schools and crime” they associated with the integrated city (Kruse
247). Outside the perimeter in places like Cobb and Gwinnett County, secessionists were
joined  by  new  suburbanites,  who  had  not  necessarily  participated  in  the  original
migration from Atlanta, but readily adopted the same political mantras of low taxes
and individualism, which, in practice, were racial politics nonetheless (Kruse 243-266).
Political Scientists Byron E. Shafer and Richard Johnston argue that these economically
based preferences, rather than race, were the primary force transforming the South
into a new Republican stronghold. However, as Lassiter and Kruse point out, this new
politics  was  different  from  and  more  than simple  racism,  since  middle  class  status
insulated middle class and affluent whites from racial others nearly as effectively as
whiteness.  Suburbia  was  also  one  of  those  racial  advantages  that  many  white
Americans forgot about very quickly, embracing instead what Lassiter calls a myth of
“racial innocence” (Lassiter 2004, 558). But, significantly, it was a myth they shared
with suburban whites all over the country. Ironically no one understood this better
than  Mississippi  Senator  John  Stennis,  who  protested  in  1970  that  federal  policy
unfairly  targeted  the  de  jure  segregation  of  the  South  while  leaving  the  de  facto
segregation of Northern, Western and Midwestern suburbs intact (Crespino 175).
12 To those who are tempted to draw a straight line from Goldwater, through Wallace, to
Nixon and beyond as evidence of Republicans manipulating white Southerners through
carefully coded appeals  to their  racism, the new critics  of  Southern exceptionalism
point to other, less-well-known forces working at the grassroots of Southern politics
and culture—namely, moderation. This was true, as historian Joseph Crespino shows,
even  in  the  “most  Southern  place  on  earth”:  Mississippi.2 Though  Crespino
unflinchingly  recounts  the  familiar  and  undeniable  violence  of  Mississippi's  white
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supremacists and the below-the-belt tactics of its Citizens' Council, he also documents
the early emergence of a new, business-oriented, urban and suburban political elite
who were committed to projecting an image of moderation while preserving the racial
status quo. This Mississippi would be unrecognizable to a casual acquaintance familiar
only with the Mississippi of “Eyes on the Prize.” Even the Sovereignty Commission, the
notorious  state  surveillance  agency  formed  to  monitor  and  discourage  civil  rights
activity in Mississippi, had by the early 1960s added white extremist organizations to
its  list  of  charges,  attempting  to  channel  white  resistance  into  “more  subtle  and
effective  strategies.” In  line  with  the  political  wisdom of  Commission  director  Erle
Johnston, for example, the Americans for the Preservation of the White Race, had, by
1965, stopped using words “nigger” or “Negro,” replacing them with “'communists' or
subversive  individuals” (Crespino  108).  As  Crespino  documents  so  well,  Mississippi
didn't need Republican presidential political strategists or white suburbanites to invent
“conservative color blindness and racist code words” (Crespino 8) because they had
them all along: “states' rights,” after all, had never required anyone to use the N-word.
Thus the Civil Rights Act was a “dangerous and unconstitutional expansion of federal
powers” and  school  busing  violated  “freedom  of  choice.” Mississippi  Republicans
likewise  attempted  to  work  defenses  of  racial  tradition  into  a  broader  platform of
conservative ideology.
13 By 1970, Lassiter argues, white Southerners preferred moderate policies and candidates
who  employed  a  language  of  abstract  principles  over  open  defiance  and  political
extremists—a  lesson  that  Nixon  learned  the  hard  way.  One  of  the  few  “genuine”
incarnations of the Southern strategy, Lassiter argues, was Nixon's decision in the 1970
midterm elections  to  lend  his  support  to  the  Southern  Republican  candidates  who
represented the most extreme racial backlash to court-ordered school desegregation
and busing. In theory (Kevin Phillip's theory to be precise) such a strategy would have
hastened Southern partisan realignment. However, centrist Democrats triumphed over
race-baiting Republicans in several key gubernatorial and Congressional elections. By
1970, Southern suburbanites, like their American counterparts, seem to have rejected
massive resistance in favor of  moderates who,  in the very least,  paid lip service to
integration and “equal rights” while opposing busing and “special treatment” (Lassiter
2006, 251-275). In Charlotte, NC, for example, subject of the infamous Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education (1971) Supreme Court case, the white suburbanites who
formed the Concerned Parents Association to oppose “two-way” school busing were not
racists in the conventional sense. Unlike the old adherents to massive resistance, they
did not categorically reject integration in principle. Rather they considered themselves
“good  citizens,”  who  had  had  the  foresight  and  affluence  to  purchase  homes  in
neighborhoods with good schools whose rights as taxpayers and consumers were now
being violated (Lassiter 2006,  121-147,  Lassiter 2004).  It  was in this  capacity,  not as
white  Southern  racists,  Lassiter  argues,  that  white  Southern  suburbanites  actually
identified with Nixon and the “Silent Majority.”
14 Such reexaminations of Southern political, social, and cultural history have been long
overdue,  and  they  have  made  enormous  contributions  to  late  twentieth century  US
history. The national success of Nixon's appeal to middle-class whites who disdained
social  engineering  in  the  name  of  racial  equality  is  an  extraordinarily  important
historical insight that challenges myths about American racial innocence. The similarity
of white responses to busing across regions, for example, and the hypocrisy of Hubert
Humphrey and other non-Southern Democratic liberals who resisted the application of
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integrationist remedies in their own backyards has newly exposed the emptiness of
distinctions between de jure and de facto segregation (Crespino 178-180). The triumph
of “moderate” politics in the South of the 1970s over the diehard segregationists still
beating the same drum likewise challenges any scholar  who would draw a straight
historical line of continuity between the Dixiecrats and the Southern Republican party.
But  is  it  time  to  forget  the  Southern  strategy  and  declare  the  “end  of  Southern
history”?
15 One remaining—and substantial—hurdle is that the “Southern strategy” still explains a
lot about national politics, even if the details need modification. Perhaps the “Southern
strategy” was not as successful as Kevin Phillips, author of the New Republican Majority,
assumed it  would be,  but it  is  nevertheless very difficult  to deny that the National
Democratic  Party's  open embrace of  federal  civil  rights  legislation contributed to a
fundamental political realignment in the United States beginning in 1964. Even Lyndon
Johnson expected to lose  white  voters  in Southern states  after  passage of  the Civil
Rights Act. On the other side of the coin, Phillips predicted that the Republicans would
never again get more than “10 to 20 per cent of the Negro vote” after determining to go
“where the [potential new Republican] votes are” (Boyd 106). And both were correct.
The regional and racial repositioning that occurred after 1964 can be described and
circumscribed in many ways: as the dissolution of the New Deal coalition, as a shift
limited to Presidential politics that proceeded in fits and starts until the 1980s, or the
Republicans'  successful  seduction  of  disaffected  white  Southern  voters.  But  it's
undeniable that most Southern states gave up their knee-jerk support for the national
Democratic Party, and this was an extraordinary development. Let's recall that we're
talking about states that were so firmly Democratic at the national level that they even
supported Adlai Stevenson in 1956. We can never be entirely sure what precise slogan
or policy attracted each individual white Southerner who cast a vote for Goldwater,
Wallace, Nixon, or later, Reagan, but there were quite a few who openly declared that it
was the Democrat's support for national civil rights legislation. In any case, a great
number of  them obligingly trooped the polls  and acted according to  contemporary
predictions.
16 There's also the problem of all those smoking guns that the Republicans left behind.
“Coded language” was not the modern invention of historians, it was an open secret in
the Nixon political camp. Although Nixon and many other Republican operatives were
often guarded or defensive about the Republicans' relationship to the white South in
the  1960s  and  1970s,  their  memoirs,  recordings,  and  internal  documents
unapologetically rehash their efforts to court white Southern voters with appeals to
race. Special Nixon commercials were created for Southern audiences, many featuring
Strom Thurmond “talking about crime, busing, and the Supreme Court”—all issues that
had been inseparable from race for the past 15 years, and were firmly racialized in the
context of the federal government's 1968 hardline position on Southern desegregation
plans (McGinnis 122). Or take Nixon's position on “law and order.” In 1968, after four
summers  of  urban populations  across  the  United  States  exploding  into  open racial
rebellion, Nixon recorded a television ad bemoaning the “decline of ‘law and order' in
American cities.” The ad itself did not mention race, but viewing it, Nixon declared that
this campaign spot “hits it right on the nose…It's all about law and order and the damn
Negro-Puerto  Rican groups out  there” (Carter  1996,  30).  Nixon's  campaign advisors
even edited out an image of a little boy “staring in the smoldering ruins of what had
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been his home” because it might suggest “sympathy for Negroes who riot” (McGinnis
116).
17 Some Republicans have been forthcoming about how this tradition was carried over
into later decades. While many denied that Ronald Reagan's decision to kick off his
1980 Presidential campaign in Neshoba County, Mississippi with a speech declaring his
belief in “states' rights” was intended to appeal to white racism, others admitted that
“abstract”  or  coded language was  deliberately  employed to  do exactly  that.  As  Lee
Atwater,  a  Reagan  advisor  explained  it  to  a  political  scientist  in  the  early  1980s,
Republicans  would  win  white  Southern  votes  by continuing  in  the  same  tradition
established in the 1960s. “You start out in 1954 by saying, 'Nigger, nigger, nigger,'”
Atwater explained, “By 1968 you can't say 'nigger'—that hurts you. Backfires. So you
say stuff like forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff.” In the process the racial
issues become “abstract,” even if a “byproduct of them” is clearly a differential effect
on racially identified groups and “blacks get hurt worse than whites.” By 1980, the
Republicans were “doing away with the racial problem one way or the other…. because
obviously sitting around saying, 'We want to cut this,' is much more abstract than even
the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than 'Nigger, nigger.'” (Lamis 26).
18 That these confessions are rare and severely outnumbered by examples of moderate
speech by Nixon et al. is no accident. Political strategists understood that the successful
deployment  of  a  Southern  strategy  in  a national  election  depended  on  moderate
language,  the  appearance  of  sincerity  (as  opposed  to  cynical  pandering),  and  the
articulation  of  a  national interest.  “We  should  disavow  Phillips'  book  [The  New
Republican Majority] as party policy,” Nixon political strategist Harry Dent advised, but
“stick with the silent majority theme.” (Lassiter 2006, 241). Phillips, after all, had been
fairly  blunt  in  public  about  the  “Southern  strategy”  and  how  this  approach  used
knowledge about “who hates whom” to win elections (Carter 1996, 43).  Although in
private  Nixon  and  his  advisors  were  at  times  equally  coarse  about  their  political
machinations,  they  carefully  tuned  their  public  speech.  In  South  Carolina  “Dirty
Tricks” Dent once attempted to discredit a political opponent by publicizing a picture
of him shaking hands with a black man. But as an advisor to the President, he declared
in Time Magazine, “this country is bigger than the South… the President has to have a
stance  that's  national.”  If  Dent  had  “[taken]  up  the  South's cause,  waved  the
Confederate flag, and [run] all through the White House yelling and being parochial,”
he explained in 1969, it would have done more harm than good (“Nation: Up at Harry's
Place”  1969).  Even  Southerners  in  the  South  weren't  doing  that  any  more.  The
President could win the votes of  the extremists anyway,  Dent advised privately,  by
“retreating  from  aggressive  civil  rights  enforcement  and  making  sure  that  voters
blamed the Democrats for 'massive integration'” (Lassiter 2006, 241). Besides, moderate
opposition worked as strategy. Protecting “neighborhood schools” prevented genuine
and meaningful school desegregation from ever becoming a reality. That it permitted
its adherents to express their support for Brown V. Board of Education at the same time
was an added political bonus.
19 The basic premise of the “Southern strategy” also fits too neatly with some of what we
know  about  the  development  of  Southern  politics.  One  of  the  most  extraordinary
contributions of recent works in Southern history has been the careful documentation
of  that  surprisingly  gradual,  bottom-up transformation of  the  politics  of  race  from
simple, overt racism to one that preserves and defends racial privilege in more subtle
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ways, encapsulated in many cases within a single generation or the political careers of
single individuals. It was accompanied by a gradual transformation of state and local
politics in the South from support for conservative Democrats, who had rarely followed
the  lead  of  the  national  party  anyway,  to  Republicans.  As  Dan  Carter  reminds  us,
George Bush Sr., embarked on his political career in Texas by running as a Republican
challenger to an incumbent Democratic Senator who had voted in favor of what would
become the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bush did not defend segregation per se, but he
expressed opposition to an “unconstitutional” abuse of federal power. “The new civil
rights act was passed to protect 14 per cent of the people,” he explained in a campaign
speech;  he  was  “worried about  the  other  86 per cent”  who would be  affected by  it
(Carter 1996, xi, xii). In Mississippi, white Republicans who took over the state's party
apparatus likewise sold themselves not as a local opposition party but as an alternative
more effective than the Democrats' defense of segregation. There is also an essential
continuity across many individual cases of partisan shifts. Many Southern Democrats,
like Senator Strom Thurmond of SC or Jesse Helms of NC retained essentially the same
political  positions  for  most  of  their  careers  and  simply  switched  parties.  While
challengers to the “Southern strategy” interpretation have complicated this narrative
by  revealing  its  bottom-up  qualities,  the  development  of  moderate  language  and
strategy, the failures of extremism, or the slow evolution of partisan change at the state
and local level, the basic shift in the second half of the twentieth century is hard to
dismiss.
20 This is even more compelling if you consider who else in the United States would like
for us to forget about the Republican party's links to the Southern strategy. Remember
what happened in 2002 when Republican Senate Minority leader Trent Lott dredged up
unwelcome  memories  of  the  roots  of  the  Southern  G.O.P.  with  a  remark  at  Strom
Thurmond's 100th birthday party? Mississippi had voted for Thurmond when he was
the States'  Rights Party presidential candidate of 1948, Lott reminded the audience,
and, he declared: “We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our
lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years, either.” According
to the Washington Post, the comment drew “an audible gasp and general silence” even in
that  presumably  sympathetic  crowd.  Newspaper  stories  registered  the  predictable
liberal outcry and, in what was perhaps a revelation more caustic than their inevitable
history primer on just what Thurmond and States' Rights stood for in 1948, the papers
reminded readers that Lott had made essentially the same remark at a 1980 Jackson,
Mississippi campaign event for the saintliest of all recent Republicans, Ronald Reagan.
Some  conservative  pundits,  like  Pat  Buchanan,  defended  Lott  (and  by  extension
Reagan) against what they saw as an unfair attack by a biased media. But mainstream
Republicans,  including  the  Bush  White  House,  and  many  conservative  intellectuals
dropped Lott like a hot potato. “Oh God,” William Kristol, editor of the conservative
Weekly Standard, reportedly said, “It's ludicrous. He should remember it's the party of
Lincoln.”  Lott's  spokesmen  attempted  to  deflect  the  criticism  with  a  two-sentence
statement that “Senator Lott's remarks were intended to pay tribute to a remarkable
man who led a remarkable life. To read anything more into these comments is wrong.”
(Edsall 2002, 6) But it was nearly impossible not to, and Lott was ultimately forced to
resign from his post as a Party leader.
21 Significantly, the Lott episode reveals some important things about American political
memory:  It  is  short  and  selective.  Born  in  1941,  Trent  Lott  was  an  undergraduate
student  at  Ole  Miss  in  1962  when students  rioted  to  block  the  admission of  James
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Meredith.  He  himself  played  a  key  role  in  blocking  the  integration  of  his  national
fraternity  (Tumulty).  After  law  school,  Lott served  as  an  aide  to  Democratic
Congressman and signer of the notorious “Southern Manifesto,” William Colmer.  In
1967 Lott  campaigned for  the arch-segregationist  gubernatorial  candidate  John Bell
Williams. When Lott was elected to the House of Representatives in 1972, he entered as
a Republican, but acted the Southern part,  leading the fight against IRS regulations
threatening  the  tax-exempt  status  of  lily-white  private  schools  in  Mississippi  and
persuading Congress  to  restore citizenship to Confederate President Jefferson Davis
(Crespino 211, 257-61).  All  the while he collected votes and warm support from the
Council  of  Conservative  Citizens,  whose  literature  and  rhetoric  were  littered  with
unapologetic paeans to white supremacy (Edsall, 1999, A2). None of this prevented Lott
from becoming a Republican Party leader.  No one really seemed to care much, and
besides,  Lott's  positions  and  his  ultra-conservative  supporters  could  be  easily
attributed  to  his  hardfast  support  for  small  government,  fairness,  heritage,  states'
rights, etc.
22 And yet, his praise of Thurmond—an offensive remark to be sure but one that really
harmed no one except the Republican party—proved to be the one historical genie that
could  not  be  put  back  into  the  bottle  of  states'  rights.  When  Lott  stepped  down,
removing another smoking gun from prominent view, party leaders and conservative
pundits emitted a nearly audible collective sigh of relief.  Lott,  Kristol optimistically
asserted, was “really virtually the last of the products of Richard Nixon's 'Southern
strategy' to be in major positions of power in the Congress, and with his leaving, you
will have cleared out people who, fairly or unfairly, have a somewhat compromised
image to the country as a whole'' (Perdum A18). The funny ending to this story—or sad
ending,  depending  on  your  politics—is  that  Lott  rose  again  anyway.  In  2007,  the
Republican party, praising his effectiveness and his legislative expertise, elevated him
once  again,  this  time  to  the  position  of  minority  whip.  Lott  supporter  and  future
Republican  Presidential  candidate  John  McCain  remarked  that  ”We  all  believe  in
redemption… Thank God.“ (Leibovich 1).  What redeemed Lott with the Republicans,
however,  was  not  his  remorse  (which  did  appear  genuine)  or  reparations,  but  his
political effectiveness in holding his Senate seat in 2006 and the work he did for the
Party. ”Lott could still get elected“ plus ”Lott helped the Republicans“ equals ”end of
story.“
23 Other twenty-first century Republican encounters with the Southern strategy betray a
similarly cynical concern with the bottom line: election numbers. In 2005 the chairman
of  the  Republican  National  Committee  Kenneth  Mehlman  admitted  to  an  NAACP
audience that in the 1960s the Republicans ”gave up on winning the African American
vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit from racial polarization.“ And ”we were
wrong.“ Mehlman did not own up to just what ”racial polarization“ had meant in the
trenches: the offensive advertisements,  the preservation of racial  stereotypes (black
criminals and welfare queens), or the policies that perpetuated segregation. Instead he
focused on selling a ”new opportunity for the party of  Lincoln and for the African
American  community  to  restore  our  historic bonds.“  CNN  anchor  John  King  asked
Mehlman pointblank ”If  a  Republican candidate in the next  election cycle  uses the
confederate flag [as Republican Governor Sonny Perdue had in 2002]… will [you] and
the president of the United States, George W. Bush, stand up and say 'stop' and cut off
their money?“ Mehlman waffled. The Governor of Georgia, he said, was a ”good man“
who was doing a ”fantastic job of reaching out,“ and had won ”a significant percentage
Forgetting the South and the Southern Strategy
Miranda, 5 | 2011
10
of the African American vote“ (CNN late edition)—even though Perdue actually carried
a lower percentage of black votes (6%) than his Republican counterparts in 1994 (10%)
or 1998 (8%) (Hayes and McKee 8). Fortunately Perdue never forced anyone to ”stand
up“—at least not in 2005. On the other hand, Republican remorse over the Southern
strategy had not stopped Perdue from courting the Flaggers' votes in the tight election
of 2002. The portion of the electorate that reliably responds to such new-fangled but
old-style ”Southern“ appeals may have diminished, but it is clearly still an important,
and perhaps a critical margin in some elections.
24 In this country of fresh starts and second chances, Americans like to leave what are
often  ugly  historical  truths  behind.  Even  George  Wallace  earned  redemption  for
renouncing his segregationist past—enough to win a substantial number of black votes
in his fourth successful campaign to become governor of Alabama in 1982. Of course it
helps that Americans have short memories. In Georgia, defenders of the old Stars-and-
Bars  state  flag,  nearly  five  decades  removed from its original  installation,  willfully
ignored the fact that it was a symbol of the 1950s rather than the 1860s and demanded
its reinstallation in the name of yet another newly sanitized history of states' rights,
the Confederacy.  But  the problem is  greater  than forgetting.  Many candidates  who
have, and would continue to, exploit racial polarization to win votes want to rewrite
history to  suit  their  needs.  In  the 1980s  Strom Thurmond defended his  run as  the
Dixecrat's Presidential candidate as merely an effort ”to protect the rights of the states
and the rights of the people,“ and not the ”race fight“ it was subsequently labeled by
”some in the news media.“ (Noah 2011). When presented with a transcript and film
footage of his 1948 speech where he declared, ”There's not enough troops in the Army
to force the Southern people to break down segregation and admit the Negro race into
our theaters, into our swimming pools, into our homes, and into our churches,“ the
Senator's  aides  responded  with  shock  and  Thurmond  himself  with  ”incredulity,“
according to biographer Nadine Cohodas. Once he was convinced that the excerpt was
indeed a genuine record of his speech, Thurmond remarked, ”If I had to run that race
again…I would word it differently“ (Cohodas, 177).3 The words mattered, because once
”segregation“ and ”Negro“ were part of the record, it was much harder to defend as an
abstract position on ”states' rights.“
25 In  2010  Haley  Barbour,  a  veteran  of  Nixon's  1968  campaign,  attempted  a  similar
whitewashing of Mississippi and his own history in The Weekly Standard. Barbour ”just
[didn't] remember [the civil rights era] as being that bad.“ Contrary to what people
might have thought ”up north,“ Barbour claimed, the Yazoo County Citizens' Council
was ”an organization of town leaders“ that actually kept the peace and the Klan out
(Ferguson).  Barbour's  reconstruction  was,  in  some  very  technical  but  ultimately
meaningless sense, at least partly correct since that's how it may have appeared to
white people. As Joe Crespino recounts, Yazoo City avoided headline-grabbing violence,
while the Citizens' Council fought desegregation with intimidation and the discipline of
white pocketbooks. In 1955, the Citizens' Council published the name and address of
every parent who had petitioned the local school board to desegregate city schools in
the local paper and displayed the same list of names in every store window in town. All
but two of the petitioning parents ”suffered some form of economic reprisal, most of
them losing their jobs or businesses“ (Crespino 29). Yazoo County whites may not have
permitted interference by the Klan, but they didn't need it anyway.
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26 In  response  to  criticism  of  his  selective  memory,  Barbour  issued  a  statement  re-
describing the Citizens' Council as ”totally indefensible, as is segregation.“ But Barbour
curiously misremembered other aspects of his own past, disingenuously claiming that
”his  generation“  went  to  integrated  schools  (though  he  did  not)  and  recalling  a
chummy relationship with Verna Bailey, the first black woman to attend Ole Miss (who
had no memory of him). When Barbour's name popped up as a potential Presidential
candidate in 2012, all his trials with racial insensitivity, including his association with
the Council of Conservative Citizens, became fair game once again. Newsweek columnist
Ben Adler commented that even if Barbour's racial indiscretions disqualified him from
candidacy, it made little difference in terms of Republican racial policy—except for his
tendency  toward  incriminating  gaffes,  Barbour  was  ”substantively  no  different  on
racial  issues  from  his  primary  opponents“  (Adler).  But  politically,  Republicans  and
conservative pundits know, Barbour's link to Southern racism was a deal breaker for
those who like to think of  themselves as racially enlightened conservatives.  If  only
because Barbour is a white Southerner from Mississippi of a certain age, making him a
national figurehead in the Republican party would inevitably invite suspicion of the
motives  behind  the  usual  G.O.P.  cry  of  fiscal  and  social  conservatism.  Should  the
Republicans ever finally be successful at disowning the ”Southern strategy,“ however,
it would certainly make their positions easier to defend as colorblind. 
27 As a scholar, based on my own research and that of others, I do believe that there was a
Southern strategy, even if the project of correctly characterizing it is ongoing. I am
convinced,  also,  by  the  new  literature  that  it  is  a  very  complicated  phenomenon,
influenced by multiple factors. I'm painfully aware that maintaining the idea of the
Southern  strategy  as  the source  of  modern  conservatism  entails  other  kinds  of
oversimplifications and compromises by those of us who care about setting the racial
record  straight,  and  that  if  we  want  to  get  it  exactly  right  we  have  to  be  more
sophisticated. I also agree that one of the problems with talking about the Southern
strategy in particular, and Southern Exceptionalism in general, is that it has prevented
Americans from having a deeper understanding of the history and context in which
recent political conservatism developed. While no one denies that racial elements were
central to the history, a Southern focus lets all the other white Americans who remain
convinced of their own racial innocence off the hook, while strengthening the myth
that the white South was the odd outlier in an otherwise racially liberal, fair-minded
political culture. This myth, deeply etched in Americans' collective popular memory,
has undoubtedly misrepresented and obscured the nature of American racism.
28 However, as with all myths, there is an essential kernel of ”truth“ at the heart of the
”Southern strategy“ that scholars must address. Southern white voters were distinctive
and remain distinctive in their overwhelming support of modern conservative politics
in  the  twenty-first century.  Some  contemporary  white  Southern  voters  are  recent
migrants to the region, but many are the very same people who cast votes in 1968—I
know some of them in fact. To a large extent, white racial ”innocence“ is undoubtedly a
persistent theme,  as  middle and upper class  whites can afford to be cavalier about
government programs and social welfare policies that do not benefit them. It's also
undoubtedly true, as Joe Crespino and Lisa McGirr have shown, that the rejection of
liberalism increasingly had as  much to do with conservatives'  concern about social
values  as  it  did  civil  rights.  The  conservatives'  agenda has  broadened considerably
beyond the economic and civil rights issues at the forefront in the 1960s. But the South
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still stands out with respect to race and region. As Dan Carter has pointed out for the
2004 election returns, white Southerners are almost twice as likely as white Americans
elsewhere  to  vote  for  Republicans.  In  2004,  52% of  white  Americans  in  households
earning from $ 30,000 to $ 100,000 and 58% of those earning more than $ 100,000 per
year  voted  for  President  George  Bush,  while  74%  of  white  Southerners  earning
$ 30-100,000 voted for Bush and the percentage of wealthy white Southerners was even
higher (Carter 2007).
29 The  2008  Presidential  election  likewise  revealed  an  even  more  distinctive  pattern
among Southern whites. Although Barack Obama failed to win the majority of white
votes nationwide, his support from whites in the deep South was markedly lower—just
10% in Alabama, 11% in Mississippi, 14% in Louisiana, 23% in Georgia and 26% in South
Carolina. In Florida, North Carolina and Virginia, the Southern states carried by Obama,
he won just 42%, 35%, and 39% of white votes. Even in Arizona and Alaska, the home
states of  John McCain and Sarah Palin,  Obama won 32% and 40% of the white vote
respectively. Only in five other states – Idaho, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming
—did the white vote for Obama dip under 35% (Noah 2008). Racism probably prevented
some whites from voting for Obama, but it would be foolish and somewhat simplistic to
assume  this  of  the  majority—that  isn't  the  point.  Many  Southern  whites  would  be
unlikely to vote for a Democrat, no matter their racial identity or beliefs about race, for
many reasons. But even if this is a new incarnation of Southern white identity different
from the racist reactionaries that conventional wisdom has associated with the late
1960s and early 1970s or even the 1980s, it does appear to be a racial, regional identity,
just one generation removed from segregation.
30 It would be a shame if arguments over the success or failure of the Southern strategy as
an explanatory mechanism or over the ”myth“ of Southern history prevented us from
examining such regional and racial continuity as we struggle to put the last fifty years of
American political  history in perspective.  There are,  as  so many recent books have
persuasively argued, many reasons to doubt that Southern whites were the tail that
wagged the dog of Republican ascendancy. There are also many reasons to think, as
Lassiter and Crespino argue so persuasively, that much of what were once believed to
be  differences  of  kind are  really  differences  of  degree.  But  the  white  South of  the
Southern  strategy  is  not  simply  a  historian's  creation.  Rightly  or  wrongly
contemporaries  also believed in it  and many white  Southerners  acted in ways that
appeared to affirm it. Although many Republicans would like to forget, many have not.
In 1981,  a  repentant  Harry Dent,  who had given up his  legal  and political  work to
“follow the Lord, full time,” admitted that his “biggest regret” about his political career
was “anything I had done to stand in the way of the rights of black people.” (Sawyer).
31 Recent  works  in  Southern  history  have  been sensitive  to  the  conceptual  confusion
between  the  South  in  American  memory and  the  South  of  American  history.  We
historians struggle to get the history right, but surely one of our goals in doing so is to
improve the memory of the public in these matters we consider so important. We must
seek to modify the public's distorted memory of the South, but we also have to preserve
those  elements  whose  place  in  memory  serve  as  reminders  of  some  of  the  more
repulsive historical truths about the United States. For better or worse, the partially
false memory of the “Southern strategy” is one of the few, if  not the only, modern
instances where Americans actually do remember that “states'  rights,” “freedom of
association,” or the Confederate battle flag have loaded meanings—racist meanings—
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beyond what is  immediately apparent in the words or the image.  Even if,  as  many
historians now argue, the link between the Southern segregationist past and America's
conservative present is not the whole story, it's a large part of the story and provides
the most damning reconstruction of colorblind politics there is. For while the present-
day opponents of “special treatment” or “judicial remedies” may deny that America
has  a  problem with racism,  no one with a  prayer  of  getting elected or  influencing
opinion would defend the Jim Crow South or the tactics used to perpetuate segregation.
“States' rights” has only worked as an amoral mantra of national conservatism when
stripped of its ties to white Southern heritage.
32 Regardless of whether we as historians think there “really” is a South or not anymore,
there is in the public mind an idea of the South and a Southern identity. The idea is in
many ways pernicious and ought to be revised to more accurately reflect our American
truth. But ideas, like memory, have their own reality nonetheless, and in matters of
identity  ideas  can  be  incredibly  powerful.  Those  in  Georgia  who  sought  to  return
Confederate stars and bars to the state flag did so for some reason. Perhaps those white
Georgians do not remember how the stars and bars got there. Perhaps they genuinely
believed, as a Dodge County member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans opined, that
the flag is “for all people that fought in the civil war whether they were white, black,
red,  yellow, the Hispanic,  the Jews” (“Dodge County NAACP”).  And one response to
flaggers would be to argue that they really are no longer that different from other
Americans and have no distinctiveness worthy of recognition. But another would be to
point out that their symbols have a history that almost no one would defend.
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NOTES
1. The new Georgia flag was deemed the “worst-designed state or provincial flag in
North America” by the North American Vexillogical Association. Jackson, “State Flags
of Georgia.” 
2. “Most Southern” from the title of James C. Cobb's The Most Southern Place on Earth: The
Mississippi Delta and the Roots of Regional Identity (1994). 
3. I found this quotation through Timothy Noah's article in Slate Magazine.
ABSTRACTS
This  paper  examines  recent  historical  arguments  against  relying  upon  “Southern
exceptionalism”  and  the  “Southern  strategy”  to  explain  late  twentieth-century  partisan
realignment. While acknowledging the seminal contributions of this new literature, the article
examines  some  of  the  historical  evidence  supporting  the  traditional  interpretations  of  the
Southern strategy and some of the ways that the “Southern strategy” has figured into recent
American  politics.  Though  the  emphasis  on  the  South  has  distorted  the  memory  of  overall
American resistance to civil rights and social change, the article suggests that Southern history
nevertheless plays a unique and important role as a reminder of American resistance and the
race-based origin of many colorblind social policies.
Cet article étudie les arguments récemment avancés par les historiens pour remettre en question
l'explication du réalignement partisan de la fin du 20e siècle,  fondée sur l'“exceptionnalisme
sudiste” et la “stratégie sudiste”. Tout en reconnaissant les apports majeurs de ces nouveaux
travaux,  l'article  souligne  certains  éléments  historiques  tendant  à  prouver  la  validité  des
interprétations  traditionnelles  de  la  stratégie  sudiste  et  de  la  manière  dont  cette  dernière  a
influencé la politique américaine récente. Si le fait de porter l'accent sur le Sud a déformé la
façon dont on se souvient de la résistance américaine à la reconnaissance des droits civiques et
au changement social, cet article suggère cependant que l'histoire du Sud joue un rôle unique et
important de révélateur de la résistance nationale et des fondements raciaux de nombreuses
politiques sociales censées être racialement neutres.
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